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C REC  PAGE   DESCRIPTION
C00001 00001
C00002 00002	Emphasize improving training and discipline.
C00003 00003	How do we know:
C00006 00004	The Continued Need for Nuclear Energy
C00010 00005	The Soviet Response to the Accident
C00013 00006	Notes on Soviet report
C00016 ENDMK
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Emphasize improving training and discipline.

In some important ways, the Soviets have reacted correctly to Chernobyl in
avoiding panic and have reduced the costs of over-reaction.

[panel wants to see wording].

[The liberal press will react favorably to including some favorable remarks
about  the Soviets]

Does Chernobyl approximate worst case?  

What about a NYT magazine or Scientific American article based on the report?
Bethe and Cohen ?and Ray

How we know what we know.
How do we know:

Our conclusions about Chernobyl are mainly based on what the Soviets have said
supplemented by observations made in Europe.  Many people ask whether the reality
might be quite different.  they speculate that the soviets may be concealing
thousands of fatalities as certain U.S. officials stated, on the basis of
misinterpreted satellite data, shortly after the accident.

Our opinion is that the incomplete information so far furnished by the Soviets
about the extent of the accident, the number of who died, the number with serious
radiation injury, and the measures taken to deal with the crisis are substantially
accurate. They agree with what foreign doctors have observed, with the results of 
foreign journalist intervies with evacuees from Pripyat (including children),
and with later interpretation of satellite data, and with the reports of travellers
to Kiev.

Moreover, if the number of dead is more than a thousand, as was speculated, 
this will become increasingly known to the public in Kiev and from them to 
Russian speaking visitors.

The main facts about the reactor design were published by the Soviets in many 
articles in their engineering journals long before the accident . Many foreign
nuclear engineers have visited them.

Furthermore, many Soviet scientists and engineers have personal relationships
with foreign colleagues and are very reluctant to lie to them. They prefer
to say nothing when telling the truth is not allowed. Of course, this is 
especially true if a lie will eventually be found out.  The above doesn't apply
to Soviet diplomats, propagandists and newspapers that lie all the time--even
when the truth is well known to their audience.

The Soviets have not so far revealed much information about the cause of the
accident and its consequences.
The Continued Need for Nuclear Energy

	This report is not the place to repeat all the arguments for
nuclear energy.  However, since the Chernobyl accident occurred in
1986 it is worthwhile summarizing what has happened since the
``energy crisis'' of 1973 and the first ``successes'' of the
anti-nuclear movement about 1975.

	Since 1973 there has been a sustained effort to develop
``alternative'' sources of energy.  In spite of many billion
dollars in direct expenditures and large tax subsidies for windmills,
synthetic oil and gas, fusion energy, solar energy, and wave and
tide energy, their prospects for economical production of domestic
electricity look no better than they did in 1973.  The
countries that have resolutely forged ahead with nuclear energy,
such as France and Japan, have passed the U.S. in percentage of
electricity generated by nuclear energy and have experienced lower
electricity costs than the more hesitant countries like the U.S.
France now gets 65 percent of its electricity from nuclear energy.

	There are now 500 reactor years of experience with nuclear
power.  Before Chernobyl, Three Mile Island was the worst accident.
It killed no-one, and experience now confirms what was predicted
in the 1960s.  Nuclear power, with the safety standards that
have prevailed in the U.S., is the safest form of large scale
energy.

	Even Chernobyl, in spite of its widespread release of
radiation, is unlikely to cause as many deaths in the long run
as have certain individual coal mine disasters and dam failures.

	While there is a temporary oil surplus, no-one expects it
to last long.  The environmental costs of coal have become clearer.
The probability that the world will have to greatly reduce its
use of combustion in order to prevent excessive increase in carbon
dioxide in the atmosphere has increased.

	Both the success of nuclear energy where vigorously pursued
and the extremely limited success of alternatives recommend to the
U.S. that we continue and revitalize our nuclear program while improving its
already excellent safety.

[Will there be an estimate of the total long term world-wide
fatalities from Chernobyl?]
The Soviet Response to the Accident

	The Soviet handling of the accident and its consequences
will have important lessons in the long run for the U.S.  Namely,
we will be able to observe the consequences of a resolute policy
of minimizing the economic, technological and psychological effects.
They are evacuating as few people as seems to them safe.  They
will start the other reactors as soon as possible, and they
will make safety improvements in similar reactors and the procedures
for their operation concurrently with their continued operation.

	The West in general, and the U.S. in particular, would not
pursue such a policy in a similar situation, because of the
existence of a strong political anti-nuclear movement.  The Soviets
will make that experiment for us, and we need to observe it closely
in all its aspects.

	First we need to observe the consequences of their policy
of minimal evacuation, if that's what it turns out to be, for the
health of the population of the surrounding area.  It is very
important that agreements to cooperate in doing that have already
been reached.

	Second the psychological effects of their policy on the
people of the Ukraine in general and Kiev in particular need to
be observed.  Is there panic?  Are people moving away?  Admittedly
it will be difficult to draw consequences for the West from this,
because of the control of information in that communist country.

	Third we need to observe the economic consequences of
Chernobyl.  What does the cleanup cost?

	Of course, there is an excellent chance of avoiding any accident
of similar scope in the West because of differences in technology
and procedure as outlined elsewhere in this report.
Notes on Soviet report

1. The post-accident medical measures seem to have been according
to an elaborate existing protocol.  On p. 48 of Appendix 7 there
is a reference to "experience gained previously".  This suggests
that they have had previous large radiation accidents, e.g. the
Urals accident in the late 1950s.  The relevance to us is that
we can learn from them about how to be prepared to treat victims
of radiation accidents.

In contrast to this, the preparation of the plant and the local
authorities for an accident appears to have been minimal to nonexistent.

The readiness for measuring contamination of the environment
also seems to have been excellent, again suggesting previous
experience.

Perhaps we need to persuade the Soviets to release more information about
their previous experience with radiation injuries and and ecological
contamination.

2. Many of the fatalities resulted from extensive skin damage.
This damage could have been prevented by protective clothing.
The report notes damage to the skin of the feet and legs from
water saturated shoes and socks.  For this reason, it is best
that the clothing be water proof, especially the footwear.
If I read it correctly, there was less damage to the lungs, and
that was from ingestion of particles.  Simple mechanical filters,
as in ordinary military gas masks would have prevented that.
The fatalities would have been much fewer had the fire fighters been
better prepared.

Perhaps U.S. preparations for dealing with accidents at reactors
need to be examined as to whether there is enough protective
clothing stored for fire fighters, etc.

3.